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News of the investigation broke when the Washington Post reported that investigators seized the work laptop, personal laptop, phone, and smartwatch of journalist Hannah Natanson, who has covered the Trump administration’s impact on the federal government and recently wrote about developing more than 1,000 government sources. A Justice Department official told the Post that Perez-Lugones had been messaging Natanson to discuss classified information. The affidavit does not allege that Perez-Lugones disseminated national defense information, only that he unlawfully retained it. The Justice Department and the Washington Post did not respond to request for comment.
The affidavit provides insight into how Perez-Lugones allegedly attempted to exfiltrate information from a Secure Compartmented Information Facility, or SCIF, and the unexpected way his employer took notice.
According to the FBI, Perez-Lugones printed a classified intelligence report, albeit in a roundabout fashion. It’s standard for workplace printers to log certain information, such as the names of files they print and the users who printed them. In an apparent attempt to avoid detection, Perez-Lugones, according to the affidavit, took screenshots of classified materials, cropped the screenshots, and pasted them into a Microsoft Word document.
By using screenshots instead of text, there would be no record of a classified report printed from the specific workstation. (Depending on the employer’s chosen data loss prevention monitoring software, access logs might show a specific user had opened the file and perhaps even tracked whether they took screenshots).
Perez-Lugones allegedly gave the file an innocuous name, “Microsoft Word – Document1,” that might not stand out if printer logs were later audited.
In this case, however, the affidavit reveals that Perez-Lugones’s employer could see not only the typical metadata stored by printers, such as file names, file sizes, and time of printing, but it could also view the actual contents of the printed materials — in this case, prosecutors say, the screenshots themselves. As the affidavit points out, “Perez-Lugones’ employer can retrieve records of print activity on classified systems, including copies of printed documents.”
It’s unclear which printer management software was used by Perez-Lugones’s employer. But several commercial systems allow workplace administrators to view the contents of printed documents.
For instance, PaperCut software offers a print archive feature that, when enabled, allows system administrators to browse the contents of all documents printed or scanned through its software system.
Whenever someone presses print in a network outfitted with this printer monitoring software, the program creates a clandestine copy of the file and generates an image of page every printed. This happens in the background — users might be entirely unaware that the contents of printed files are archived. Workplace administrators can choose how long to retain copies of the documents and how much space the documents can take up.
Aside from attempting to surreptitiously print a document, Perez-Lugones, investigators say, was also seen allegedly opening a classified document and taking notes, looking “back and forth between the screen corresponding the classified system and the notepad, all the while writing on the notepad.” The affidavit doesn’t state how this observation was made, but it strongly suggests a video surveillance system was also in play.
Perez-Lugones’s lawyers did not respond to a request for comment.
